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ABSTRACT 
A significant number of security breaches result from 
employees’ failure to comply with security policies. Many 
organizations have tried to change or influence security 
behaviour, but found it a major challenge. Drawing on previous 
research on usable security and economics of security, we 
propose a new approach to managing employee security 
behaviour. We conducted interviews with 17 employees from 
two major commercial organizations, asking why they do or 
don’t comply with security policies. Our results show that key 
factors in the compliance decision are the actual and anticipated 
cost and benefits of compliance to the individual employee, and 
perceived cost and benefits to the organization. We present a 
new paradigm – the Compliance Budget - as a means of 
understanding how individuals perceive the costs and benefits of 
compliance with organisational security goals, and identify a 
range of approaches that security managers can use to influence 
employee’s perceptions (which, in turn, influence security 
behaviour). The Compliance Budget should be understood and 
managed in the same way as any financial budget, as 
compliance directly affects, and can place a cap on, 
effectiveness of organisational security measures. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: Human/Machine Systems – 
human factors, human information processing. C.2.0 
[Computer Communication Networks] General –security and 
protection 
General Terms 
Management, Economics, Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Security policies, security behaviour, Compliance Budget, 
compliance 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely acknowledged in security research and practice that 
many security incidents are caused by human, rather than 
technical failures (e. g. Schneier 2000).  Researchers 
approaching the issue from a Computer-Human Interaction 
(CHI) perspective – e. g. Whitten & Tygar (1999) – 
demonstrated that many human failures are caused security 
mechanisms that are too difficult for ordinary users. Even users 
with good technical skills such as systems administrators and 
software developers often struggle to keep up with the increased 
complexity and workload created by security mechanisms 
(Zurko & Simon, 1996; Flechais et al. 2003).  The primary goal 
of the flourishing research community focusing on usable 
security, known as HCIsec, is to provide security tools that the 
intended users can operate correctly [e.g. Yee 2005] and 
complete a security task – such as encrypting an email - 
effectively.  Other key usability criteria established by the HCI 
research community – user satisfaction and user cost – have 
hitherto been addressed implicitly rather than explicitly in 
usable security research.   
Adams & Sasse (1999), Weirich & Sasse (2001), and Weirich 
(2005) pointed out that to achieve effective security from an 
organisational point of view security designers and managers 
need to consider that: 
1) Individual users have a choice on whether to comply with 
security policies, and 
2) This choice is influenced by the individual’s own goals, 
perceptions and attitudes, and norms which govern the 
individual’s behaviour.   
Throughout this paper, we assume that the context is one in 
which the employee has a choice. We recognize that in certain 
high-security contexts, user choice can be curtailed or removed 
entirely.  But we focus on the majority of organizations where 
security is not a top priority, and compliance cannot be 
constantly monitored and enforced . 
Recent evidence suggests that in these contexts, managing 
employees’ security behaviour is still a major challenge.  
Johnson & Goetz (2007) cite Theresa Jones, a security manager 
at Dow Chemical:  
“My biggest challenge is changing behavior. If I could change 
the behavior of our Dow workforce, then I think I’ve solved the 
problem.” 
Changing behaviour is important, but needs to be accompanied 
by changes in the security tools and models used. How can this 
be done? Johnson & Goetz (2007) report that current attempts 
focus on placing more responsibility on line managers, in some 
cases even imposing financial penalties on them if an employee 
they are responsible for causes a security breach.  
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that 
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy 
otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, 
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
NSPW ‘08, Month 22 - 9, 2008, Olympic Valley, California, USA. 
Copyright 2004 ACM 1-58113-000-0/00/0004…$5.00. 
 
While we agree that economic reasoning may help to change 
employee behaviour, Weirich (2005) found that negative 
reinforcement - which would include financial sanctions for 
security transgressions– used in isolation, are as ineffective in 
changing security behaviour as they have been in changing 
behaviour most other areas of life.  We propose 1) that 
understanding the economics of compliance from an 
individual’s point of view provides a better basis for influencing 
individuals’ security behaviour, and 2) that organisations should 
accept that compliance with security policies is a finite resource 
that needs to be carefully managed.  We express this proposal in 
form of a new paradigm – the Compliance Budget. The results 
of the interview study presented in this paper show that 
individuals and organisations place different values on the cost 
and benefits of behaviours associated with security policies, and 
that an individual employee’s choice - to comply, or not to 
comply – with a security policy is determined by the perceived 
cost and benefit.  The choice is not an entirely selfish one – 
individuals consider the cost and benefits to both the 
organisation and themselves – but:  
1) The perception of cost and benefit is centered on the 
individual employee’s immediate work context, 
2) There is a limit to the amount of effort individuals are 
prepared to expend on compliance unless there is a perceived 
benefit to balance it,  
3) Cost-benefit imbalances accumulate until the compliance 
limit is reached. 
In the following section, we review previous research on 1) 
organisational approaches to managing security and compliance, 
2) economic techniques can be applied to security and security 
spending, and 3) factors influencing individuals’ security 
behaviour in organisational settings. Section 3 describes the 
empirical study we carried out to collect data on individual and 
organisational perceptions of cost and benefits of security 
measures. In section 4, we present the costs and benefit of 
security measures from individual employees’ perspective. 
Section 5 presents the new paradigm derived from those results 
– the Compliance Budget – and discusses how this notion helps 
to gain a differentiated view of the overall cost of complying 
with a security policy.  In section 6, we outline two ways in 
which the notion of a Compliance Budget can be applied to 
manage security behaviour:   
1) Organizations should track compliance efforts required by 
different groups of employees, and ensure the limit is not 
exceeded. As with any other budget, this can be done by 
prioritising compliance on key security goals, and removing the 
need to comply with less important ones. 
2) Organisations can influence individuals’ perception of cost 
and benefit of security measures, e.g. through awareness and 
education, and improved risk communication,   
2. BACKGROUND 
In an increasingly tougher economic climate, organisations have 
to decide how to spend their resources most effectively to 
achieve their operational goals.  While IT spending over the past 
few years has remained fairly flat, spending on IT security has 
increased by around 17% per year (Huang et al., 2007).  But 
there is growing awareness among researchers in information 
security that the resources an organisation can spend on IT 
security are limited, and have to be targeted to protect the assets 
and processes that matter most to an organisation.  Attention has 
also been paid to the most effective way of disbursing a limited 
security budget in the face of a variety of threats. Huang et al 
(2007), for instance, highlight the need to “minimize security 
risks with limited resources for implementing security 
technologies and programs.”   
To achieve this, there has been a growing trend in information 
security research to employ economic models and approaches to 
support decision-making regarding spending on corporate IT 
security. Gordon and Loeb [4] argue strongly for applying 
formal cost/benefit analysis techniques to the process of 
managing corporate IT security.  There is an ongoing research 
effort to improve and refine the metrics that could be used in 
information security, e.g. Herath and Herath (2007).   
But to achieve meaningful metrics, security needs to be seen in 
the context of the business it seeks to protect.  To deliver 
effective IT security, one must not only understand the threats to 
an organisation, but how security fits into its  business goals and 
processes.  As Johnson & Goetz (2007) point out, the biggest 
challenge for security metrics is linking them  to business in a 
meaningful way; for example, being able to state the cost to the 
business of a security incident in terms of revenue loss. 
Currently there are no tools for managing security behavior and 
modeling the impact of policy changes. This is something this 
paper begins to address. 
Equally challenging is establishing a metric’s validity and 
building metrics that change over time to incorporate changes in 
the organizational and risk environments while still allowing 
meaningful comparison to previous results.  The losses incurred 
by a breach in confidentiality are very different from those 
resulting from an availability failure (Kumar et al., 2007) and so 
threats to availability and confidentiality need to be treated 
differently depending on the focus of the organisation. Security 
officers and corporate decision-makers therefore need to have a 
full range of information about the systems they are working 
with.  By treating security spending as an economic exercise, it 
is possible to for organisational decision-makers and security 
specialists to develop a common framework and language for 
planning and designing an organisation’s security policies. 
Even though everyone understands that employees play a key 
part in any organisation’s processes and performance, they do 
currently not feature in the attempts to model the cost and 
benefit of security measures.  We argue that this needs to be 
changed: any reasoning about cost and benefit of security 
measures has to include the impact that those security measures 
have on individual employees.  Effective security relies on 
employees complying with security policies, i.e. exhibiting the 
behaviours specified in the policies.  Previous research on users 
and security (Adams & Sasse, 1999, Weirich & Sasse, 2001, 
Weirich 2005) has pointed out that - unless there is constant 
monitoring and enforcement - individual users have a choice on 
whether to comply with security policies, and that this choice is 
influenced by the individual’s own goals, perceptions and 
attitudes.   If the individual’s goals, perceptions and attitudes are 
aligned with those of the organisation, then no conflict exists, 
and most individuals are likely to comply with the policies.  
The aim of the study reported in this paper was to explore the 
relationship between individual security behaviour and 
organisational security when there is a conflict of interest, i.e. 
when the behaviour required by a security measure is not 
aligned with individual employees’ goals. Employees focus on 
completing their primary (production) tasks, and the behaviour 
required by the security (enabling) tasks often presents an 
obstacle on the shortest path to primary goal (Sasse et al. 2001).  
This misalignment introduces friction between security and 
business processes into the organizational system, and it is this 
friction that is at the heart of individual compliance issues. 
We explore how economic techniques can be applied to 
effectively manage these conflict situations. The results from 
our study show that techniques of economic management and 
optimisation can be usefully applied to model this situation. 
There is a limit to the amount of effort individuals are prepared 
expend on security measures that do not obviously contribute to 
their key production tasks, and this extra non-productive effort 
required accumulates until a limit is reached. We have named 
this limit the Compliance Budget. There are two key benefits 
that can be obtained from understanding this effort:   
1) Organisations can focus the effort available on key 
security tasks to maximize their return on investment 
and avoid wasteful expenditure on less critical 
measures. 
2) It is possible to determine the cost of achieving an 
employees’ compliance with a security measure, and 
to include this cost in models of cost and benefit of 
security measures. 
3. THE STUDY 
To obtain an empirical basis for our model, we conducted a 
study to elicit factors that contribute to corporate and individual 
security cost. One of the authors conducted 17 in-depth 
interviews with security staff, employees and managers in two 
major UK companies – a financial institution and the research 
lab of a technology company.  The interviewees included the 
chief security officers in both companies, and 4 security 
researchers or operational security staff.  The remaining 10 
participants were staff working in the companies’ main-line 
activities – financial services or technology research, and one of 
them was a lawyer.  All participants had a university degree and 
at least two years’ work experience. 
The interviews were semi-structured, exploring 
• The tasks and responsibilities of interviewees, 
• Their perception of the risks facing the company, 
• Their attitudes to the company’s security polices and security 
measures, and 
• The perceived impact of security measures on individual’s 
tasks and responsibilities, and company productivity. 
Whilst the interviews covered a range of security policies and 
measures, all interviewees were asked about their usage of one 
specific bit of technology - USB sticks- and their awareness of 
security policies surrounding the use of these policies.  These 
sections of the interviews have been analysed in-depth and 
reported elsewhere (Pym et al. 2008).  For this paper, we 
analysed the transcripts of the interviews in their entirety, and 
analyzed using techniques from Grounded Theory. Grounded 
Theory [Strauss & Corbin] is a qualitative data analysis method 
widely used in social sciences, which allows identification of 
salient concepts and relationships between them. Over the past 
10 years, the method has been successfully applied to model 
user perceptions and attitudes in Human-Computer Interaction 
in general. Adams & Sasse (1999) used this approach to identify 
factors that affect employees’ perceptions of corporate security 
policies, and Weirich & Sasse (2001) modeled employee 
decision-making on compliance with password security policies. 
The interviews using axial coding (the first stage of Grounded 
Theory) to produce an inventory of the individual employee’s 
cost and benefit associated with security policies and 
mechanisms they came in contact with, and the cost and benefit 
for the organization. Data were coded by two researchers 
independently. 
4. RESULTS 
The analysis of the interviews provided many examples of 
participants complying and not complying with security 
measures.  The costs and benefits of security policies featured 
large in individuals’ discussions of their security behaviour.  
This is not, however, a simple equation compliance = cost to the 
individual, benefit to the organisation, and vice versa. Rather, 
the actual costs and benefits are a complex web of perceived 
costs and benefits to the employee (both from a professional and 
individual point of view), and the perceived cost and benefit to 
the organisation.  The individual employee’s perception of cost 
and benefit is, however, largely determined by the impact of 
compliance on their tasks and responsibilities; the goal of their 
primary work task dominates their perspective whereas the 
security goal of the organization is a distant spot on the horizon. 
We identified a number of different scenarios in which 
individual cost/benefit decisions were traded off against 
compliance with security policies. These are described in detail 
in the following section. 
4.1 Example Cost/Benefit Scenarios 
In this section, we present 5 key scenarios illustrating 
individuals’ cost/benefit perceptions of security measures.  The 
quotes from the interviews illustrate the examples given. 
Centrally scheduled maintenance tasks, such as weekly 
automated virus scan 
Participants provided many examples of production tasks being 
disrupted by centrally scheduled maintenance tasks, such as 
virus checker updates, patches, and licence management 
software. The effect is either a complete interruption of the 
employee’s production tasks, or their machines being slowed 
down to the point where they cannot work effectively: 
P6: “when [the virus scanner] is turned on, our program takes 
an extra 20 minutes to build and test”.  
Most participants acknowledged that there was a purpose to 
those security measures. If they had the luxury of doing so, they 
would re-organise their work: “go for a coffee”, and resume 
when the maintenance task was completed.   All participants felt 
it was justified to circumvent these security measures if they 
interfered with their ability to deliver their work on time, 
especially if they were up against a deadline.  A minority, 
however, was more militant, feeling that no interruption of their 
work was justified. Each participant seemed to evince some 
awareness of the tradeoff between personal and organizational 
good. 
P3: “Anything that loses time is not good for the business.” 
Others were clearly resentful of the loss of control over their 
own machines, and their ability to complete their work being at 
the mercy of “whatever they think of next”, especially if they 
could not perceive any benefit of those updates.  In one of the 
organisations, several employees had permanently opted out of 
the updates: 
P11: “next thing I know I’m installing some tiresome patch that 
I don’t want to be installing... I used to circumvent that 
whenever I was in this building.” 
Employees did this either openly or covertly (some deliberately 
switched to an operating system or application software that was 
not centrally supported) - some with, some without knowledge 
of the security/IT managers.  Most employees were aware that 
there must be organisational need for running these updates, and 
that their “opting out” would undermine this. 
P16: “different IT groups all want to scan these machines so I 
don’t think they are too happy about that.” 
The prevailing attitude, however, was that - whatever the 
organisational need for these measures - it did not justify 
“stopping people from getting their work done”, and leaving 
several participants to wonder “why they cannot run these 
things at night?”This last example highlights a lack of 
awareness that their might also be conflicting goals at the 
organizational level, in this case the desire to reduce energy 
consumption versus effective security. 
4.1.1 Additional authentication 
Several passwords need to be (re)entered, e.g. to connect to 
additional VPNs.  At worst, failure to recall the correct 
password leads to failure to access (no availability), which in 
turn means inability to get work done.   
P3: “The only [problem] I can think of is if either you lose a 
password or forget it.” 
Additional passwords increase cognitive load, and worry that e 
systems recall password accurately.  
P10: “there are a lot of systems that need a lot of passwords 
and you know keeping a track of them is a bit of a pain.”  
Additional authentication hurdles cause delay in accessing 
systems and cause frustration at having to repeat a task. 
4.1.2 Using encryption for data storage/transfer 
Mandatory use of encryption for all data stored on USB sticks.  
For some participants, the risk to availability of data they 
needed was the key concern, but many participants balanced this 
against the confidentiality risk to their organisation.  
From the individual’s perspective, the worst-case cost is 
permanent loss of data or lack of availability at a critical time 
for their tasks.  The very possibility of losing access to data was 
an unacceptable cost to some participants. 
P12: “I just feel a lack of control because most of the time the 
threat is unavailability created by the encryption system.” 
The fear of the risk to availability is deep, and several 
participants expressed a fundamental unwillingness to rely on a 
technology they did not understand. 
P13: “I know very few people who run encrypted file systems on 
a laptop ... because they don’t trust the file system. They want 
their data to be accessible.” 
In this context, data does not equal data – the fear is strongest 
for data that individuals have created or generated themselves; 
they felt strong ownership and resented this date being subject 
to a blanket company policy. 
P10: “[USB encryption] would be irritating because much of 
the content is private.” 
Even if the data would not be permanently lost (e.g. because the 
file is still on the organisation’s system) there a perceived risk to 
availability: not being able to access the data when it is needed.  
The result could be lost business opportunity, or embarrassment 
(looking incompetent). 
P1: The only one I can think of would be the password on the 
device - I could forget it.  
I: And what would be the result?  
P1: I wouldn’t be able to do my presentation. And that would be 
quite embarrassing. 
The additional time to encrypt and decrypt data was a lesser 
perceived cost. 
P10: “there is a cost to [USB encryption] in that it wastes my 
time.” 
These perceived costs made some participants feel entitled to 
break the policy 
P10: “if {USB encryption] was mandated I would probably 
work around it.” 
while others acknowledged the risk to the organisation, and the 
consequences that a breach of confidentiality would have. 
P5: Well, for sure, a competitor could get hold of something and 
do something with it. The press could find out there was a 
breach and publicize that. And the client wouldn’t be too happy. 
It’s just bad at all levels if confidentiality were breached. [If] 
there was any perception of wrongdoing it taints the firm’s 
brand and the value of that is huge.” 
 
4.1.3 Restrictive Firewall 
Firewall settings blocking access to a wide range of websites – 
from adult entertainment to social networking. In the worst case, 
participants reported that they could not get their work done, 
e.g. software developers could not access ports needed for 
running a virtual machine, and felt they had to break the policy. 
P6: “the [company] firewall doesn’t like those network ports 
being open. It lacks flexibility… By being too restrictive for my 
use they end up forcing people to cheat to disable things.” 
Other participants perceived the restrictions as more than an 
inconvenience – they felt it could damage business, and this, in 
turn would also affect their earnings: 
P5: So how do you quantify that extra cost? … [it] can range 
from something as dramatic as business we won’t win because 
we’re not aware of information. And those fees [we miss out on] 
could be millions of dollars over 1 year or 2. You know, if a 
company went public that we just had no idea existed, because 
we couldn’t see the webpage. 
Participants felt they were being forced into workarounds, so 
they work effectively. 
P4: “I think people don’t try to not follow the rules just for fun. 
When we do it’s for a reason.” 
4.1.4 Over-zealous security classifications 
Participants from one organisation stated that all data and 
documents tended to be blanket-marked as confidential.  They 
reported that this led to unintentional breaches of the security 
policy, e.g. when sharing data with colleagues outside the 
organisation, even though the sharing was clearly needed to get 
their work done. 
P10: “there is a kind of blanket imposition of inappropriate 
security restraints, sometimes on documents.” 
Not being able to share data was seen as resulting in lower 
productivity and freedom of thought/expression. 
4.2 Perceived Cost and Benefit 
As Weirich (2005) points out, when an individual is presented 
with a security task, he has a choice of  
1) Complying and performing the required behaviour (at 
least try to do so), or  
2) Attempting to bypass the task. 
The results from the analysis of our interviews suggests that the 
decision – to comply, or not to comply - is the result of an 
internal cost/benefit analysis, in which the individual weighs up 
the advantages and disadvantages of complying or not 
complying.   This does not mean individuals regard compliance 
with security behaviour purely as a cost: the participants in our 
study value security, both for themselves and for the 
organisation they work for. The initial disposition is to comply 
with security policies - up to the point at which the perceived 
benefit of doing so is exceeded by the costs associated with 
complying.  (Or the point at which anticipated cost of 
complying – i.e. worrying about forgetting a password, and the 
consequences of forgetting it – is perceived to be higher than the 
benefits of compliance.) Examples of costs perceived by 
individuals are: 
1) Increased physical load.  These are extra steps added 
to production tasks, increasing time and effort 
required to execute production tasks (such as a 
machine being slower because of security updates), or 
new tasks added (such as additional authentication to 
enter building/log in to network, additional training to 
be completed for new security devices). 
2) Increased cognitive load – additional information 
needs to be stored and recalled on demand (such as a 
password to encrypt/decrypt data).  Research in 
psychology and human-computer interaction has 
established that human will try to avoid increased 
cognitive load even more than increased mental load 
(e.g. Norman, 1983). 
3) Embarrassment – security measures impacting on 
business practises may cause the individual 
embarrassment (such as not being able to open an 
encrypted file for presentation to a customer or 
audience) in addition to the inability to complete the 
task.  Individuals also anticipate that the perceptions 
formed as a result of such an event could have a 
potential long-term negative impact on their career.. 
4) Missed opportunities – the increased time required to 
go through the steps of a security task, or the 
restrictions placed on data access by a security policy 
may mean a worker in a competitive environment 
misses an opportunity to effectively do business e.g. 
websites relevant to a deal blocked by firewall rules.  
As with embarrassment (3), individuals are concerned 
about the cost of long-term impact on their career. 
5) The ‘Hassle Factor’ –the perceived the cost associated 
with complying is often higher than the actual cost, 
because the knock-on effect on certain situational or 
contextual factors.  For example, if an individual is 
under pressure to meet a deadline, waiting for a patch 
to install feels more onerous than if it happens over 
lunch or at a period of low activity. 
 
At the same time, compliance with required security behaviour 
can have perceived certain benefits: 
1) Avoiding the consequences of a security breach.  The 
most obvious benefit is avoiding the consequences of 
a security breach – such as losing data – which would 
have a negative impact on the individual’s task. 
2) Protection from sanctions – there is no danger of 
being “caught” in breach of policy, and exposed to the 
sanctions stipulated by the organisation.  Therefore 
the individual does not have to worry about being 
caught, or the sanctions.  However, the degree of  
worry  depends on the individual’s risk appetite (see 
section 5), and the likelihood of sanctions being 
applied.  Adams & Sasse (1999) and Weirich (2005) 
point out that if policies are routinely breached, but 
stipulated sanctions are not applied, individuals quite 
reasonably do no expect any consequences from being 
caught in breach of policies. 
.    . 
5. DISCUSSION: THE COMPLIANCE 
BUDGET, AND HOW TO MANAGE IT 
Security mechanisms will not be effective if individual 
employees chose not to comply. . Most employees will comply 
if this does not require any additional effort.  When extra effort 
is required, individuals will weigh this extra effort against 
benefits for them, in the context of their production tasks.  If 
their goals are aligned with the organisation’s security goals, 
there is no conflict, as the behaviour required individual 
translates into perceived gain for them as well as for the 
organsiation. Thus, security policies are likely to be followed – 
at least by most individuals, most of the time. 
(Based on the results of Weirich (2005), there will be some 
exceptions to this rule, because 1) some individuals have a high 
propensity for risk-taking, or 2) some individuals may have 
other issues with the organisation, and contravene security 
policies as a way of expressing dissatisfaction or dissent.) 
Conversely, most individuals will not be inclined to choose the 
behaviour required by the organisation if there is a conflict 
between the security behaviour and their own goals. In this case, 
either some part of the joint set of goals will not be met, and the 
individual to expend effort without gain to help the 
organisation’s security goals. 
Compliance is if the individual chooses the behaviour required 
by the organisation, even though it makes it harder for them to 
realise their goals, or even prevents them from reaching them 
altogether. Compliance can be seen as a kind of organisational 
altruism. From the individual’s perspective, this is a situation of 
‘pain but no gain’ (recall we are focusing on conflict situations 
where individual and organizational goals are unaligned). The 
‘pain tolerance’ - the amount of extra effort an individual is 
prepared to make for no personal gain – is what we call the 
Compliance Budget. The limit of the Compliance Budget is 
referred to as the compliance threshold; this being the point at 
which the individual no longer has the will to comply with 
official requirements. The closer an individual is to his 
compliance threshold the higher the cost to the organisation of 
achieving compliance, as the perceived cost to the individual 
will also be higher. Once the compliance threshold has been 
exceeded, there will be almost no way to achieve compliance, 
except through heavy monitoring of individuals’ behaviour, and 
enforcement. 
When an individual is faced with a compliance decision, the 
costs detailed in the results section will be weighed up by the 
individual (consciously or subconsciously) and measured 
against the benefits. As stated before the issue of compliance 
only comes into question when the individual is placed in a 
situation where there is a cost to him but no direct benefit. The 
decision to comply or not comply can be addressed by the 
following simple formula: 
 Task cost = individual benefits – individual costs. 
 Compliance if task cost < compliance threshold. 
It is worth mentioning at this point that the hassle factor will 
also bring into play the effect of previous security tasks. If the 
task in question is the tenth that day, the individual has been 
expected to undertake it will be seen as a far greater burden than 
the exact same task earlier in the day. This means that a steady 
erosion of the Compliance Budget will take place as tasks stack 
up, and the individual’s tolerance for further tasks (or repetitions 
of the same task) will be reduced. 
In addition to the internal factors identified in section 4.2, there 
are external factors that impact an individual’s compliance 
budget. External factors are created by the production task 
performed by the individual, and the organisatonal environment. 
It is factors in this second category that security managers can 
use to influence individuals perceptions of cost and benefits of 
compliance, and their security behaviour. Most of these 
measures are well known measures; the advantage of seeing 
them in the context of the Compliance Budget is that 1) these 
measures can be targeted more precisely to influence cost-
benefit assessment, and 2) the impact of these measures on 
employee security behaviour can be understood and measured.  
The key  external factors are: 
1. Design.  A) The most direct way to influence cost-
benefit perception is to reduce the actual mental and 
physical workload that individuals have to expend on 
compliance. B) Well-designed security seeks to 
minimize friction between security and business 
processes, and avoids putting individuals in situations 
where they have to choose between security goals and 
production goals. Improving the design of the security 
system will reduce the cost of each security action, 
meaning more tasks can be undertaken within the 
same Compliance Budget. 
2. Awareness, Training, Education. A) Effective training 
in using security measures can improve individual 
performance, which in turn reduces the cost associated 
with security measures.  It can also build individuals’ 
competence – which is a benefit to them, and their 
confidence – which can reduce stress and anxiety 
associated with C3 and C4 (see section 4.2) with using 
security mechanisms.  B)  Raising awareness of the 
risks and vulnerabilities faced by the organization 
increases the perceived benefits of compliance. .  
3. The culture of the organization.  The more security-
minded an organization is, the less friction compliance 
causes.  Weirich & Sasse (2001) report that 
individuals’ security behaviour is strongly influenced 
by behavioural norms – most individuals try to “fit 
in”, rather than seek conflicts with their colleagues.  
Building a positive and strong security culture reduces 
friction and perceived cost of compliance 
4. Monitoring.  The visibility of the organisation’s 
compliance monitoring, and willingness to administer 
advertised sanctions, will determine how likely it is an 
individual thinks they will be detected and 
reprimanded if they do not comply with policy. This 
will in turn feed into their decision to comply or not. 
5. Sanctions.  Avoidance of sanction is a perceived 
benefit.  Thus, for sanctions to be effective, they must 
be enforced, and seen to be enforced (Sasse et al., 
2001) used in response to a security failure will be 
factored in to the cost/benefit analysis of the 
individual. They influence the level of perceived 
benefit from the protection gained through 
compliance. 
In general, each of the external factors affects either the total 
Compliance Budget, or the rate at which it is spent. This is an 
important distinction to make, as there is a finite improvement 
that can be made to the total Compliance Budget available 
through improving awareness, training and culture. Beyond this 
limit, further attempts will be counterproductive either in the 
business sense (time spent away from work) or in terms of the 
Compliance Budget (individual costs imposed through time 
taken up and attention demanded away from the individual’s 
agenda). The implication here is that initial gains should be 
made through reducing the cost of each security task, and 
therefore slowing the rate of spending of the Compliance 
Budget. The most effective way to do this is to improve the 
design and integration of the security system. 
The effect of the Compliance Budget and compliance threshold 
is to place a cap on the effectiveness of an organisation’s 
security policy – the compliance limit. Once this threshold is 
reached, several outcomes can result, of varying significance. 
Firstly, adding in further security measures that require 
compliance from the ‘overspent’ individuals are unlikely to 
improve security, unless they are heavily monitored and 
enforced. In some cases not only will new measures have no 
effect, but existing security measures will be become 
significantly less effective as individuals lose patience even with 
security tasks they were previously willing to undertake. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of  our empirical study allow us to draw three main 
conclusions. Firstly, an individual’s Compliance Budget sets a 
cap on the effecitveness of security practises they are involved 
in. This is because - once the threshold is crossed - the 
individual will chose work arounds motivated by their own 
needs, rather than the more altruistic process of compliance. 
Secondly, the closer an individual comes to crossing the 
compliance threshold, the higher the organisational cost of 
achieving compliance will be. This cost may come in the form 
of an increased need for monitoring and sanctions, and/or a 
passive cost in the form of increased stress and reduced 
goodwill . Thirdly, the organisaton can influence individuals’ 
perception of where the threshold lies, through an understanding 
of the decision-making and feedback cycles associated with a 
compliance.  Fourthly, the organisation can employ economic 
reasoning to ensure the available budget is used to achieve 
compliance in areas where it matters most.. A possible outline 
for these cycles is presented as part of this conclusion.  
 
Figure 1: The effect of the compliance threshold on 
organisational effort required to achieve compliance. Effort 
rises as we approach the threshold and rises dramatically 
once it is crossed. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the compliance threshold on the 
effort required to ensure continuing compliance. The closer an 
individual is to their compliance threshold, the higher the 
perceived cost of each task will be. This means that to ensure 
compliance, the organisation will have to expend more effort or 
resources in monitoring/sanctions etc. Once an individual is 
pushed passed his compliance threshold, it becomes very 
difficult to ensure compliance as the individual will be seeking 
ways to reduce the burden of compliance. The possible 
responses of the individual vary in severity. They may be 
willing to accept exceeding the compliance threshold for a short 
term if provided with sufficient motivation (increased 
remuneration, promise of future perks etc). They may continue 
to undertake their current compliance tasks, but refuse to adopt 
any further measures. In extreme cases, the individual will 
effectively cease to comply whenever possible, and focus on 
their own goals entirely. Their last resort is, of course, to simply 
leave the organization. 
 
Figure 2: How perceived individual costs relate to 
effectiveness of security. Alternative rates of compliance 
expenditure are also shown for comparison. Once the 
compliance threshold is crossed security effectiveness drops 
sharply as altruistic behaviour is increasingly exchanged for 
selfish options. 
In Figure 2, we can see how the effectiveness of the security 
system changes with the costs placed on the individual. It is 
important to recognise that it is perceived cost that is important. 
The individual is making decisions from a personal perspective, 
so it is the impression of the costs placed upon him that is 
relevant. Adding new security measures will place some burden 
on the individuals using or encountering them. This will 
increase security in the organisation. However, as the 
compliance threshold approaches, the rate of gain of 
effectiveness starts to slow as the individual perceives a higher 
cost to each new task. Once we cross the threshold, the 
individual may choose to remove himself from the security 
process, at which point the effectiveness of the system drops 
dramatically. Now not only are new measure ineffective, but 
previously-performed tasks may be neglected. The level of 
effectiveness does not return to zero because in the course of 
normal business practise certain security measures will still be 
undertaken (such as using a password to log in to the network) 
even though no effort is being expended on security per se. 
The initial gradient of the line indicates how fast the security 
budget is being spent. The more each task costs, the faster the 
budget is used up and the lower the gradient of the line. If each 
task costs relatively less we spend the budget slower and the 
gradient of the line increases. We can achieve better security 
behaviour, and a better return on security, for the same level of 
effort. By changing the rate of spending (for example by 
reducing the cost of each task through better system design), it 
is possible to alter the how effective it is possible to make the 
security of the system before this breakdown takes place. 
Spending the budget at a faster rate leads to a lower maximum 
level of security (we are able to implement fewer security 
policies before the threshold is reached). Slowing the rate of 
expenditure leads to a higher maximum level of security before 
the threshold is reached. 
So how is the Compliance Budget set, and how can the rate of 
expenditure be influenced? In answering these questions we 
must be aware that these are not set values. They exist in a 
dynamic situation, and are subject to constant change and 
revision. The results of previous compliance decisions and the 
organisational environment all contribute to the maintenance 
and expenditure rates of the Compliance Budget. This is 
illustrated in figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 3: Feedback cycle for the individual. Positive 
compliance decisions increase the weight given to individual 
costs. Negative compliance decisions increase the weight 
given to individual benefits. 
Figure 3 shows the costs and benefits that feed into a 
compliance decision from an individual’s perspective. The left 
arrow indicates the results of a positive compliance decision. 
This gives more weight to the costs associated with compliance 
as it moves the individual closer to their compliance limit. The 
right hand arrow shows the results of a negative compliance 
decision. As this increases the risk of sanctions it gives more 
weight to the benefits of compliance. Organisational factors also 
feedback into this loop as can be seen in Figure 4. 
Here we can see how the organisational environment impacts on 
the cost/benefit analysis performed by the individual. Improving 
system design, and creating a positive security culture, will 
simultaneously decrease the perceived cost of security tasks, 
and improve the rate of expenditure of the Compliance Budget. 
On the other hand increasing sanctions and monitoring will give 
more weight to the benefits associated with compliance. Both 
sides of this cycle make a positive compliance decision more 
likely. 
 
Figure 4: How organisational factors can be used to increase 
the likelihood of compliance. Improving system design and 
creating a security culture decrease the perceived cost of 
compliance. Harsher sanctions and monitoring increase the 
perceived benefits of comp. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
The aim of this paper was to identify a way of understanding 
and influencing individual employees’ security behaviour.  
Based on the results from an empirical study on the perceived 
cost and benefit of security measures, we concluded that the 
effort individuals are willing to make to comply with security 
policies is limited, and an organization can influence security 
behaviour by managing the Compliance Budget effectively. 
However, this is only part of the story. The next phase of our 
research will look at possible techniques and methods for 
achieving real-world change based on our insights. The model 
was derived from subjective data – employees recounting their 
security behaviour. Such recollections may be incomplete and 
biased, and need to be validated against objective data of actual 
security behaviour. 
We also need to explore of how relevant established theories of 
human behaviour in the face of risk – principally Adam’s (1995) 
Risk Thermostat - can be integrated with our new paradigm. 
Adam’s model suggests that an individual’s propensity to take 
risks will be influenced by the rewards experienced by risk-
taking. In our model, we have indicated that non-compliance 
will trigger a heightened awareness of the possible sanctions 
resulting from non-compliance. However, if these sanctions do 
not arrive (the individual’s lack of compliance is not detected) 
then Adam’s risk thermostat will take over and the rewards from 
non-compliance (increased working flexibility, data availability 
and spare time) will reinforce this behaviour. This indicates that 
the window for affecting compliance decisions through 
sanctions and monitoring may be small. We intend to explore 
these behaviours and their consequences through our work. 
In this paper, we talk exclusively about either the individual or 
the organisation, but these are not the only participants 
considered in a decision making process. Weirich & Sasse 
(2001) identified the influence of colleagues’ security 
behaviour, so the  way how they respond to compliance or non-
compliance needs to be taken into account. 
We anticipate that our research will lead to the development of a 
software-based compliance management tool. This tool would 
be intended for use by information security managers and policy 
designers. Appendix 2 shows a mock-up of an interface for such 
a tool. 
The core function of this tool is to track the burden placed on 
various groups or individuals by the security tasks they are 
required to undertake. The interface would then allow managers 
to view this information in several ways.  
1) They can select a security task and see which individuals, or 
groups of employees, are being asked to perform this task. The 
selected task would appear in the centre left window. Selecting 
a group or individual from this window will bring up their 
details in the centre right window. 
2) Selecting a group or individual will bring up their details in 
the centre left window. Their current and threshold costs will be 
displayed, along with their current burden, as a percentage. 
Additionally all tasks associated with this group will be shown 
below. These can be selected, thus showing their individual 
details in the centre right window. This is the type of view 
displayed in the figure. 
Below these two windows a timeline will be shown showing the 
burden on a the selected group over the current time period 
(chosen from day, week, month, year at the top of the window). 
If a task is selected this timeline will show how many groups are 
performing the task at different times. This timeline allows 
points of dangerous friction to be quickly identified. 
3) To the left of the interface are the overview and critical item 
panels. The overview panel allows the user to browse through 
all tasks and groups through an expandable menu system. The 
critical items panel alerts the user to groups that are operating 
over their threshold, or tasks that are involved in pushing a 
group over their threshold. It is anticipated that setting the 
conditions for an item to appear in the critical panel will be part 
of the functionality of the tool. 
4) This tool would allow managers to plan changes in security 
policy or employee structure and see in advance where hotspots 
of high friction would be created or removed. Reducing the 
friction between business and security is beneficial for both 
processes and this tool could play a major role in achieving that 
objective. However, we need data to allow us to set up the 
thresholds and cost values in the software. Without this data, or 
with only poor approximations thereof, this tool would be 
useless, and possibly even damaging if it leads to poor decision 
making. Providing accurate and usable data to support the core 
function of this tool would be the major contribution of our 
research. 
In summary, we have laid down the seed for a new way of 
looking at compliance decision making and its affect on 
security. Although the long term aim of the research is to 
underpin the creation of a software management tool the real-
world implications of this result, and the nature of its 
interactions with existing techniques and methods must first be 
more fully evaluated. 
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APPENDIX 1: TABLE OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPLIANCE FROM THE INDIVIDUALS 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Security Task/Policy Individual Costs of 
Compliance 
Individual Benefits of 
Compliance 
Organisational Costs  (as 
perceived by the individual) 
Organisational Benefits (as 
perceived by the individual) 
1. Centrally scheduled 
maintenance task. 
e.g. weekly 
automated virus 
scan. 
Individual’s intended task 
disrupted by the maintenance 
procedure. A time penalty is 
incurred. Workstation will 
also be slowed/blocked 
preventing other (possibly 
critical) tasks being 
completed in time. 
Protection of individual’s 
workstation/personal 
computer increased in case of 
virus outbreak. Less chance 
to have work 
compromised/destroyed/stole
n. No risk of sanctions or 
responsibility for wider 
failure. 
Reduced productivity of 
workforce thus impacting 
revenue. 
Organisational security 
improved. 
2. Additional 
authentication. e.g. 
re-entering 
passwords to 
connect to additional 
VPN’s. 
Delay in accessing the 
required systems. Increased 
cognitive load to recall 
password accurately. 
Frustration at having to repeat 
a task. 
Access to systems necessary 
for business process. No risk 
of sanctions or responsibility 
for wider failure. 
Slower business process 
reducing workforce 
effectiveness. 
Organisational systems 
blocked to unauthorised 
individuals. 
3. Using encryption for 
data storage/transfer. 
e.g. mandated use of 
encrypted USB 
sticks. 
Additional time to copy data 
due to encryption/un-
encryption. Possible loss of 
availability of data. 
No risk of sanctions or 
responsibility for wider 
failure. 
Longer time required to 
transfer data meaning a less 
dynamic and mobile 
workforce. Potential data 
loss. 
No danger of humiliating data 
leak in the case of lost or 
stolen USB devices. 
4. Restrictive firewall. 
e.g. ports needed for 
running virtual 
machines for 
software 
development 
blocked. 
Working practises need to be 
changed. Certain tasks may 
no longer be possible. 
Individual may feel forced 
into using a workaround to 
continue to work effectively. 
Loss of productivity. 
Individual is protected from 
unauthorised traffic. No risk 
of sanctions or responsibility 
for wider failure. 
Security compromised to 
facilitate necessary business 
process, or business tasks 
unable to be completed. 
Organisation infrastructure 
more secure in the face of 
various common threats. 
5. Limitations on 
working practises. 
e.g. data blanket 
marked as 
confidential. 
Unintended breaches of 
policy while collaborating 
with colleagues. Reduced 
exchange of information with 
partners. Lower productivity 
and freedom of 
thought/expression. 
Lower risk of loss of 
intellectual property, legal 
recourse in case of data theft, 
No risk of sanctions or 
responsibility for wider 
failure. 
Loss of collaboration and 
exchange opportunities. 
Reduced goodwill and 
reputation amongst 
colleagues and partners. 
Organisation’s intellectual 
property protected. 
APPENDIX 2: MOCKUP OF THE UI OF A COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT TOOL. 
 
